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1 Why do progressive voices dominate late-night comedy programming? Why is a liberal
Sean Hannity nowhere to  be found in the media landscape? Why have attempts at
producing  progressive  talk  radio  programming  failed?  These  are  questions  that
scholars of partisan media have grappled with—most of the time, unsuccessfully so—
since the advent of conservative talk radio in the late 1980s. In her latest book Irony and
Outrage:  The Polarized Landscape of  Rage, Fear,  and Laughter in the United States (Oxford
University Press,  2020),  Dannagal  Goldthwaite Young takes the reader on a journey
through  the  psychology  of  the  audiences  of  political  entertainment  programs  to
account  for  conservatives’  preference  for  the  genre  of  “outrage”  and  liberals’
predilection for irony. 
2 A  type  of  personalized  programming  dedicated  to  the  opinion  of  a  charismatic
personality  who  delivers  an  explicit  political  message,  often  in  vitriolic,  fire-and-
brimstone  fashion,  outrage  is  designed  to  arouse  anger  and  indignation.  Among
prominent outrage hosts are conservative talk radio figures like Rush Limbaugh and
the hosts of Fox News prime-time political talk shows such as Sean Hannity and Bill
O’Reilly.  Exploring  the  psychological  underpinnings  of  political  affiliations,  artistic
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tastes, and political programming consumption, and meta-analyzing a wide array of
studies in the psychology of communication—including her own work on the effects of
late-night comedy shows—Young argues that an individual’s affinity for a particular
genre does not result so much from their political beliefs and worldviews as they are
the logical extensions of a set of psychological traits that tend to be dominant among
the ideological cohort that they identify with. 
3 Among  the  many  important  contributions  of  the  book  is  the  examination  of  the
historical, cultural, and institutional contexts in which the two genres emerged and
evolved, which is the focus of the first three chapters. Entitled “The Counterculture
Comics  versus  the  Hate  Club  of  the  Air,”  chapter  1  traces  back  the  origins  of
contemporary  outrage  programs  and  late-night  comedy  shows  respectively  to  the
burgeoning  conservative  media  ecology  of  the  1950s  and  the  counterculture  satire
circuit that appeared in the early 1960s. Drawing on Nicole Hemmer’s Messengers of the
Right1, Young makes the case that today’s outrage programming finds its roots in the
anti-New Deal diatribes and predictions of impending doom of conservative radio hosts
like  Clarence  Manion,  Dan  Smoot,  and  H.  L.  Hunt,  whose  shows  were  launched  in
response to the perceived domination of mainstream news media by liberal forces. On
the other hand, the forebears of John Stewart and Samantha Bee are to be found among
the prominent satirists of San Francisco counterculture like Mort Sahl, Lenny Bruce,
and in The Committee, a collective of improvisational and stand-up comedians.
4 While both genres emerged concomitantly and were overly political,  Young argues,
they differed in the way they related to politics. As an improvisational genre, satire was
not designed to promote a particular political agenda or wield any influence on the
political  process.  On  the  contrary,  Manion  and  his  colleagues  did  aim  to  mobilize
conservative listeners and bring about political change. Nonetheless, each in their own
way  inaugurated  and  rehearsed  “affective  politics,”  approaching  politics  in  an
impassioned, instinctive manner.
5 In the second chapter, “Political and Technological Changes that Created Jon Stewart
and Bill O’Reilly,” Young fast forwards to the 1990s to examine the advent of the second
generation of outrage and satire, focusing on the launch of The Daily Show on Comedy
Central and The O’Reilly Factor on Fox in 1996. The programs’ almost instant success
played out against the backdrop of exacerbated polarization of the electorate, hyper
segmented media offer, and decreasing trust in the news media as the sector became
increasingly  deregulated  and  consolidated,  and  the  ideal  of  public  service  was
disappearing. It also occurred as traditional news and journalism were displaced by the
“talk” format, which materialized in “a shift in favor of cheaper content, including the
rise of television ‘pundits,’ people talking about news in lieu of journalists investigating
and reporting news […]” (39).
6 Both satire and outrage programming, Young argues in chapter 3 (“Outrage and Satire
as  Responses  and  Antidotes”),  emerged  as  responses  to  such  flaws,  feeding  off  of
political  polarization  and  decreasing  trust  in  the  news  media.  The  success  of
conservative talk radio programs such as The Rush Limbaugh Show in particular was
fueled by the notion that mainstream news media were playing straight into the hands
of liberals and Democrats. Later, the charismatic hosts of Fox prime-time political talk
shows (O’Reilly, Hannity, Ingraham) harnessed the affordances of media criticism to
establish themselves as alternatives to the mainstream news media, spearheading the
genre of outrage in the process. 
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7 As  genres  that  take  the  criticism  of  the  emerging  cable  news  punditry  as  its
overarching subject and use it to legitimize their own discursive positioning, irony and
outrage represent a form of “new political television” and operate as substitutes for the
decline in high modern journalism and the failures of elite journalists. On each side,
criticism of mainstream news media intensified in the wake of the 9/11 attacks: Fox
outrage hosts clamored against the alleged liberal slant in the treatment of the Bush
administration’s  response  to  the  attacks  while  Stewart’s  Daily  Show denounced  the
symbiotic relationships between political elites and the press, journalism’s failure to
analyze the attacks in the context of US financial interests in the military industrial
complex, and the spectacle of patriotism.
8 Moving away from historical considerations, Young develops her central argument in
the following chapters, through a meticulous, step-by-step analysis of the psychological
dynamics at play in the aesthetics and processing of irony and outrage. In chapter 4
Young explores “the Psychology of Satire” to deconstruct the cognitive mechanism at
work when the brain processes  humor and irony.  Just  like humor,  Young explains,
satire and irony require considerable cognitive involvement on the part of the audience
as satirical texts activate two consecutive but seemingly unrelated frames of reference,
which  forces  the  brain  to  manage  both  working  and  long-term  memories.  The
audience’s intervention is needed to resolve the incongruity between the two frames
which is inherent in satirical texts, whose meaning only emerges through the process
of reconciliation.
9 A  cognitively  taxing  endeavor,  understanding  irony  and  satire  implies  that  some
individuals more than others are likely to enjoy political humor, which is the focus of
chapter  5,  entitled “Who  gets  the  joke?”  Perception  of  humor  complexity,  Young
argues,  is  a  function of  the audience’s  processing abilities,  “as understanding irony
requires that listeners process the literal meaning first […] before using context cues to
signal the need for an ironic inversion […]” (88). This implies that individuals who tend
to understand and enjoy jokes are those who score higher in “need for cognition,”
namely, those who experience higher levels of enjoyment from “solving problems and
working through information” (88).  As understanding irony requires the audience’s
ability to retrieve certain constructs in long-term memory, an individual’s capacity to
understand irony is also a function of which scripts are available to them for activation:
without  such  scripts,  he  or  she  is  not  able  to  make  the  “appropriate  cognitive
contributions” to reconcile the incongruity (97). 
10 Along with need for  cognition,  Young demonstrates  in a  chapter  dedicated to  “the
Psychology of  the Left  and the Right” (chapter 6),  many of  the psychological  traits
associated with humor comprehension and enjoyment directly relate to artistic tastes
and political ideology. For instance, people high in need for cognition usually also score
high in “tolerance for ambiguity”—the level of comfort that an individual experiences
with  novelty  and  uncertainty—and  low  in  “need  for  closure.”  Such  underlying
psychological traits not only determine artistic tastes and preferences significantly—
people high in tolerance for ambiguity and low in need for closure tending to enjoy
abstract  painting  and open-ended  films  more  for  instance—but  also  relate  to  their
ideological leaning. Subjects that score high on the need for cognition, Young shows,
tend to be more numerous among political liberals then among political conservatives.
As individuals displaying lower levels of need for cognition, conservatives tend to rely
on judgments  made based on heuristics,  that  is,  cues  that  do  not  require  as  much
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cognitive energy as emotional responses. A consistent relationship between high need
for  closure  and  low  tolerance  for  ambiguity  and  political  conservatism also  exists,
Young demonstrates, which leads her to the conclusion that ideologies should in fact be
understood in terms of the way they satisfy an individual’s various psychological needs,
although such connections and linkages are significantly moderated by an individual’s
interaction with their social and environmental contexts. 
11 Not only do psychological traits relate to one’s artistic tastes and political preferences,
they also determine one’s predisposition to humor, Young argues in chapter 7, “the
Psychological Roots of Humor’s Liberal Bias.” All in all, need for cognition is correlated
with a general sense of humor as “enjoyment of thinking is central to appreciation of
humor and […] this may be putting liberals at a “laugh advantage” when it comes to
finding  jokes  funny”  (132).  The  extent  to  which  people  value  the  production  and
reception  of  humor  in  their  lives,  Young  shows,  is  in  fact  much  smaller  among
conservatives, who are significantly less appreciative of irony than liberals, but are also
less appreciative of jokes involving exaggeration. She concludes chapter 7 by noting
that, given their greater predispositions to understand and enjoy humor, “one should
expect liberals to gravitate toward—and produce—political information and political
genres that invite multiple layers of processing by audiences […]” (140). 
12 Young’s  analysis  of  the  way psychological  traits  shape  a  person’s  predisposition to
certain forms of political information provides a natural segue into a discussion of “the
Aesthetics of Outrage” (chapter 8). In this chapter, she meticulously demonstrates that
preference for outrage programming strongly correlates with personality traits that
tend to  be  prevalent  among individual  self-identifying as  conservative,  namely  low
need for cognition, low tolerance for ambiguity, high need for closure, and high threat
salience. In fact, Young argues, outrage programs activate exactly these psychological
traits: they identify problems and attribute responsibility in an unambiguous manner,
presenting US identity, culture, and society under threat from subversive forces, hell-
bent  on  destroying  them.  As  such,  enmity  and  the  constant  efforts  to  expose  foes
represent a considerable driving force of outrage programs. As individuals “drawn to
information  that  monitors  for  threats”  (142),  it  is  unsurprising  that  conservatives
display strong affinities for this kind of programming. 
13 On the  contrary,  the  relation between the  aforementioned psychological  traits  and
liberalism  is  reversed,  with  individuals  self-identifying  as  liberal  or  progressive
displaying  higher  tolerance  for  ambiguity,  lower  need  for  closure,  higher  need  for
cognition, and lower threat salience. As irony works through ambiguity and hybridity
and requires considerable cognitive involvement, it is unsurprising that liberals, who
score higher in tolerance for ambiguity, dominate the audiences of satirical political
programming.  Tolerance  for  ambiguity  is  in  fact  a  strong predictor  of  exposure  to
programs like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report,  while sense of humor correlates
negatively  with  viewing  outrage  programming  like  the  Rush  Limbaugh  Show or  The
O’Reilly  Factor.  “Among  conservatives,”  Young  adds,  “as  tolerance  for  ambiguity
increases, exposure to belief-confirming Hannity and Limbaugh decreases. Limbaugh
and  Hannity  are  consumed  most  by  conservatives  with  the  lowest  tolerance  for
ambiguity”  (151).  The  difference  between satire  and outrage  also  lies  in  the  hosts’
discourse about their own importance: whereas the status of late-night comedy hosts is
conferred by the “halo effect” that results from the gratification audience derives from
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understanding irony, for hosts like Hannity or Limbaugh, “it is th[e] assumed status in
moral certainty inherent in outrage” (154). 
14 These findings  do not  come without  important  caveats,  Young cautions.  As  a  clear
warning against the temptation to essentialize individuals identifying with a particular
ideological cohort, she insists that the significant variance across individuals makes it
imperative to approach the findings she presents as trends. Young also states in clear
and unambiguous terms that the literature she examines assesses individuals’ need for
cognition—i.e.,  the  enjoyment  and  gratification  a  person  derives  from  engaging  in
cognitive activities—and not capacity for cognition. She forcefully argues that in no way
should the findings she presents be construed as suggesting differences in levels of
intelligence across individuals with different political preferences. 
15 Turning to  the  functions  and effects  of  satire  and outrage,  Young demonstrates  in
chapter  9  (“Satire  and Outrage,  Parallel  Functions  and Impacts”)  that  the  need for
entertainment is a strong predictor of exposure to entertainment-oriented late-night
comedy shows (The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Saturday Night Live, Jimmy Kimmel Live and
Late Night with Conan O’Brien), but less so of exposure to The Daily Show and The Colbert
Report and  the  three  leading  outrage  programs  (Limbaugh , Hannity , and  O’Reilly).
Conversely, individuals who report watching The Daily Show and The Colbert Report for
“interesting views and opinions” are significantly more liberal than those who report
attending these shows for other reasons; similarly, the audience of outrage programs
who  report  being  motivated  by  the  need  for  information  are  overwhelmingly
conservative. 
16 The audiences of late-night comedy, Young reveals, display higher levels of information
than  those  who  do  not  watch  this  type  of  programs  and  “[…]  viewing  satire
programming  contributes  to  political  knowledge  above  and  beyond  the  baseline
political interest and education of their audience members” (174). Viewers of The Daily
Show in particular display higher levels of information than regular newspaper readers
or  the  audiences  of  network  news.  On  the  contrary,  the  audiences  of  Fox  outrage
programming  appear  the  least  knowledgeable  about  current  events:  the  kind  of
knowledge they accrue is “justified true beliefs,” namely beliefs that are held as true
despite being justified by false premises (177). Audiences of satire programming and
outrage programming are also the most politically engaged across the board. Outrage
fuels participation in the political process by activating threat salience and through its
capacity  to  attribute  responsibility  for  the  threat—what  Jeffrey  Berry  and  Sarah
Sobieraj2 refer to as the “signaling effect” of outrage programming (186)—while satire
increases  political  engagement  through  interpersonal  discussion  and  by  raising
political  efficacy among young audiences,  a phenomenon particularly visible among
viewers of The Daily Show. 
17 Significant differences exist in the way satire and outrage audiences consider the news
media. Although both tend to view mainstream news media with various degrees of
hostility and to distrust them, by mocking mainstream journalism’s tendency towards
sensationalism and profit driven routines, satire reinforces the “epistemic authority”
of the press and “reaffirms the notion that strong journalistic institutions are central to
the health of a democracy” (190).
18 In  “Playing  Against  Types”  (Chapter  10),  Young  analyzes  failed  attempts  at
conservative satire and liberal outrage by examining the demise of the radio network
Air  America and Fox’s  short-lived The Half  Hour  News Hour.  Air  America’s  failure to
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successfully produce liberal outrage programming, she contends, stemmed mostly from
being hosted by a team of journalists and comics instead of a solo charismatic figure,
when “outrage as a genre is defined by the personality, passions, and perspective of the
show’s  host  […]”  (194).  The  same failure  to  fully  grasp  the  dynamics  of  the  genre
accounts for the cancellation of The Half Hour News Hour after 13 episodes, as producers
misunderstood the importance of incongruity in satire and writers crafted jokes that
punched down at marginalized groups instead of punching up at people in positions of
power. A similar violation of the genre’s fundamental rules was visible when late night
comedians  adopted  “some  tropes  of  outrage”  in  the  early  days  of  the  Trump
administration (201),  a  moment when liberals  suddenly perceived themselves  to  be
under  threat.  This  created  momentary  disorder  because  while  threat  is  highly
compatible  with  anger  and moral  seriousness,  Young argues,  it  is  ill-suited for  the
playfulness inherent in satire. 
19 In the eleventh chapter (“Irony and Outrage – A Wild Raccoon Versus a Well-trained
Attack Dog”), Young concludes on the efficacy of irony and outrage as instruments of
political mobilization. While outrage programming’s moral certainty in its defense of
absolute truths and its capacity to explicitly identify out-groups, threats, and specific
remedies make it a very efficient mobilizing tool, irony is not employable for “goal-
driven propaganda” because  “argumentation through play  and insinuation through
irony  are  hard  to  use  for  political  gain”  (209-210).  As  exemplified  by  Stewart  and
Colbert’s Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear in October 2010, when satirists attempt to get
into the political arena and organize efforts to mobilize the electorate, they are seldom
successful.  This  leads  Young  to  the  final  conclusion  that  “outrage  is  the  tool  of
Conservative elites. But ironic satire is the tool of the liberal satirist alone” (214). 
20 Young’s  central  argument  that  irony and outrage  are  the  logical  extensions  of  the
respective psychological traits of conservatives and liberals provides a fertile ground
for the analysis of various subcategories of the genres. More specifically, her argument
on  outrage  addresses  what  had  long  remained  a  blind  spot  of  the  research  on
conservative media in spite of media scholars’ renewed interest in the influence of Fox
News  on  US  political  culture  (Reece  Peck,  Fox  Populism,  20193),  the  long  history  of
conservative  talk  radio  (Hemmer  Hemmer,  Messengers  of  the  Right,  2016;  Brian
Rosenwald, Talk Radio America, 20204 ; Paul Matzko, The Radio Right, 20205), and right-
wing journalism (A.J. Bauer and Anthony Nadler, News on the Right, 20196). Young’s book
helps illuminating in a novel and refreshing fashion our understanding of how and why
the conservative public countersphere catalyzed around the subgenre of talk radio at
the turn of the 1990s and not around other conservative media—National Review, Human
Events—or conservative programs—PBS’s Firing Line. More broadly, it provides a timely
theoretical framework to analyze the emergence of affective publics and the dynamics
of  affectivity  in  politics,  and  as  such,  resonates  meaningfully  with  the  inquiries
conducted by Zizi Papacharissi7 and Megan Boler and Elizabeth Davis8. Irony and Outrage
also opens up new avenues of investigation on more current political debates, which
are likely to both enrich and complicate Young’s argument on conservatives’ need for
cognition. For instance, if individuals self-identifying as right-wing display lower levels
of need for cognition and tend to rely on heuristics to navigate their environment, how
can we account for the success of the QAnon conspiracy theory, whose alleged leader
precisely  does  not  provide  his  or  her  followers  with information that  comes “fully
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cooked” but instead exploits  their  appetite for deciphering and decoding enigmatic
cues distilled on platforms? 
21 Similarly, as should be expected from any thought-provoking exploration of audiences’
psychological motivations,  Irony and Outrage leaves parts of the territory uncharted.
Among those are the forms of outrage programming, such as talk radio, that do include
some element of hybridity. Considering that it relies on hosts’ unscripted, free-flowing
monologues, interspersed with readings of newspaper clippings, gimmicks, songs, how
did  talk  radio  manage  to  establish  itself  as—and  to  a  certain  extent,  remain—
conservatives’ preferred medium considering conservatives’ aversion for hybridity? In
addition, although Young recognizes that conservatives and liberals are to be found
along a political continuum, the way the results are presented tends to suggest that she
treats  political  ideology  as  a  binary.  While  this  is  consistent  with  the  heightened
polarization  of  the electorate,  it  nonetheless  invisibilizes  individuals  who  do  not
necessarily gravitate towards the extremes of the continuum. In the same way, the
political media diet and motivations of individuals displaying average scores on the
different psychological traits are less fully explored. Do people who score in the middle
on tolerance for ambiguity, need for closure, need for cognition, and threat salience
have a more varied political media diet? Lastly, Young briefly mentions instances of
liberal outrage programming but does not really engage with the genre, excepted for
Air America. While The Rachel Maddow Show and All In with Chris Hayes can hardly qualify
as outrage, Countdown with Keith Olbermann, a program that aired on MSNBC for eight
consecutive years, represents a successful experiment in liberal outrage and as such, a
fertile line of inquiry. 
22 A book likely to appeal both to media historians and communication scholars, Irony &
Outrage undoubtedly  makes  a  radical  contribution  to  the  fields  of  political
communication and psychology of communication by advancing our understanding of
a topic that is both a long-standing academic concern and a central issue in the current
national  conversation  in  the  United  States  and  beyond.  The  fact  that  the  book’s
argument generates more discussion and questions is testament to just how significant
and stimulating it is. As such, it is a must-read for anyone interested in the motivations
of partisan media audiences and in partisan media more generally.
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